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Abstract
In the past, Florida judges have attempted to circumvent a parole
policy, which they considered to be ineffective. They withheld imposition
of sentence upon a defendant found guilty of the crime for which
he was charged, and imposed an order of probation with the condition
that the defendant serve a lengthy term in the county jail or state penitentiary.
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In the past, Florida judges have attempted to circumvent a parole
policy, which they considered to be ineffective. They withheld imposition of sentence upon a defendant found guilty of the crime for which
he was charged, and imposed an order of probation with the condition
that the defendant serve a lengthy term in the county jail or state penitentiary. Because the defendant was not incarcerated pursuant to a sentence, but rather as a condition of probation, he was technically ineligible for parole consideration even after he had served the statutory
period of confinement. Abuse of this technicality effectively granted the
trial judge the power to incarcerate the defendant for a full term rather
than relinquishing the discretion to the Parole Board to grant the defendant an early release.
The authority to impose incarceration as a condition of probation
is established by Florida Statutes section 948.01(4).1 The interpretation

and application of this section has continually been the source of debate and controversy. It has, however, been consistently construed to
permit trial courts to order incarceration followed by probation, or to
withhold adjudication of the defendant's guilt and impose probation
with the condition that he serve some portion thereof incarcerated.2
The abuse of the statute arose from its failure to prescribe the reasonable lengths of incarceration which could be imposed as a condition of
probation.
In its recent decision, Villery v. FloridaParole & ProbationCom1.

FLA. STAT.

2.

FLA. STAT.

§ 948.01(4) (1981).
§ 948.01(4) (1981) provides:

(4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment for a misdemeanor or a felony,
except for a capital felony, is prescribed, the court, in its discretion, may,
at the time of sentencing, direct the defendant to be placed on probation

upon completion of any specified period of such sentence. In such case, the
court shall stay and withhold the imposition of the remainder of sentence
imposed upon the defendant, and direct that the defendant be placed upon

probation after serving such period as may be imposed by the court.
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mission,' the Florida Supreme Court attempted to quell much of the
controversy by setting a maximum of less than one year for which incarceration may be imposed as a condition of probation. Furthermore,
the court established a more definite framework for application of the
statute than existed in the past, and articulated concrete guidelines for
correcting prior decisions which are inconsistent with Villery's holding.

This comment will explore the past confusion, analyze the Villery decision and review subsequent application of the statute under Villery's
direction.

Probation and the Validity of Imposing Incarceration as a
Condition of Probation
In discerning whether the imposition of incarceration as a condition of probation is proper and whether a probationer who is incarcerated pursuant to such an order is eligible to be considered for parole,
Florida's Supreme Court first considered the rationale and authority
for granting probation and imposing incarceration as a condition. Florida Statutes section 948.01(1) and (3), grants the trial court the discretion to withhold adjudication of guilt, or adjudge the defendant guilty
but withhold the imposition of sentence, and place the defendant on
probation with the hope that he may return to a useful life. This is
generally done if the court determines that the defendant is not likely
to be involved in further criminal activity and the interests of society
and justice do not appear to be jeopardized.' Moreover, the statute al-

3. 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980).
4. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(1), (3) (1981) provides:
(1) Any court of the state having original jurisdiction of criminal actions,
where the defendant in a criminal case has been found guilty by the verdict of a jury or has entered a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere or
has been found guilty by the court trying the case without a jury, except
for an offense punishable by death, may at a time to be determined by the
court, either with or without an adjudication of the guilt of the defendant,
hear and determine the question of probation of such defendant.
(3) If it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defendant is not likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that
the ends of justice and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant shall presently suffer the penalty imposed by law, the court, in its
discretion, may either adjudge the defendant to be guilty or stay and with-
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lows the court to impose probation, with or without adjudication of
guilt, to avoid inflicting upon the defendant the stigma of a criminal
conviction 5 and thus prevent the loss of the defendant's civil rights by
virtue of the criminal conviction where such a loss may not be wholly
justified.6
In granting probation, however, the trial judge may feel that a
sample of prison life would be extremely instructive as part of the rehabilitation process. In this regard, the Second District Court of Appeal
recognized "that salutary results may be obtained by first giving one
who is to be placed on probation a 'taste of prison' in order to graphically demonstrate what is likely to happen to him should he violate the
terms of that probation."17 The trial judge's authority to impose such
incarceration as a condition of probation, often referred to as the split
sentence alternative, stems from Florida Statutes section 948.01(4).
During the life of section 948.01(4), however, this grant of authority has not always been well defined. Prior to July 1, 1974, the trial
judge had specific authority only to impose incarcration in the county
jail followed by a period of probation." Therefore, the split sentence
alternative could be utilized only in the case of misdemeanor offenses. 9
However, the Florida Legislature amended the statute effective July 1,
1974, by expanding the trial court's authority to grant the split sentence alternative in cases involving misdemeanors and felonies, 10 presumably encompassing orders imposing prison sentences, as well as
terms in the county jail.
hold the adjudication of guilt and in either case stay and withhold the
imposition of sentence upon such defendant, and shall place him upon probation under the supervision and control of the [parole and probation]
commission for the duration of such probation.
5. Holland v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 352 So. 2d 914, 916 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1977).
6. Delaney v. State, 190 So. 2d 578, 580 (Fla. 1966).
7. Olcott v. State, 378 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
8. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) (1971) originally provided: "(4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment in the county jail is prescribed ... "
9. State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18, 24 (Fla. 1976).
10. Effective July 1, 1974, FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) was amended by 1974 Fla.
Laws ch. 74-112 to read as follows: "(4) Whenever punishment by imprisonment iite
county jail for a misdemeanor or a felony, except for a capital felony .... " (linedthrough words deleted, underscored words added). id. at 342.
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Despite the Florida Legislature's efforts toward clarity, the trial
courts continued to indicate confusion in their application of the statute.11 Numerous sentences of probation, imposed to follow periods of
incarceration were declared void and improper by the district courts.1 2
They generally recognized that the "withholding of sentence or a portion thereof is an indispensible prerequisite to entry of an order placing
a defendant on probation."' s Further, "[there] is no authority for an4
adjudication of guilt and a sentence to straight probation."'
"[P]robation is concerned only with suspension of the imposition or
pronouncement of sentence."1 5
State v. Jones Authorizes Incarceration for Felony Offenses as
Well as Misdemeanors
In 1976, the Supreme Court of Florida, in State v. Jones," recognized the inconsistency in the methods used by the trial courts in applying the split sentencing alternative. The court stated in Jones, that
"[the District Courts have both approved and restricted these orders
to the extent that it is difficult for the trial court to determine the
proper procedure to use."" In Jones, the defendant, after pleading
guilty to "(1) possession of heroin, (2) [issuing] a worthless check, and
(3) . . .a forged instrument," 18 was ordered by the trial court to con-

finement in the Dade County jail for one year, to be followed by five
years probation. 9 Upon violation of the probation, the trial judge revoked Jones' probation and sentenced him to three concurrent terms of
two years each in the state penitentiary.20 Upon review, the Third Dis11. Jones, 327 So. 2d at 22.
12. Waters v. State, 290 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Williams v.
State, 280 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Washington v. State, 284 So. 2d
236 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
13. Brown v. State, 302 So. 2d 430, 432 (Fla. 4th Dist: Ct. App. 1974).
14. Id.
15. State v. Williams, 237 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
16. 327 So. 2d at 22.
17. Id.

18. Id. at 20.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 21. Jones was given 135 days credit for time already served in the
county jail.
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trict Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but reversed the
sentence stating that the maximum period for which the defendant
could be incarcerated pursuant to his violation of probation could equal
original sentence withheld by the trial court at
only that period of the 21

the original sentencing.

However, the Florida Supreme Court reinstated the amended sentence of the trial court, imposed pursuant to the probation violation.
The court specifically ruled that the "trial courts have both general and
specific authority for imposition of the split sentence probation alternative."' 22 Moreover, "the trial courts of this state have the general authority to require incarceration as a condition of probation for felony
and misdemeanor offenses pursuant to the general condition provisions
While incarceration was
of section 948.03, Florida Statutes .
generally not regarded as a condition of probation, the court's holding
in Jones expressly approved the split sentence alternative as provided
by statute 24 and rejected the claim that the trial judge must withhold a
*."..-

21. Id.
22. Id. at 24.
23. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 948.03 (198,1) provides:
(1) The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probationer
and may include among them the following, that the probationer shall:
(a) Avoid injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Avoid persons or places of disreputable or harmful character;
(c) Report to the probation and parole supervisors as directed;
(d) Permit such supervisors to visit hiin at his home, or elsewhere;
(e) Work faithfully at suitable employment insofar as may be
possible;
(f) Remain within a specified place;
(g) Make reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the
court;
(h) Support his legal dependents to the best of his ability.
(i) Make payment of the debt due and owing to the state under §
960.17, subject to modification based on change of circumstances.
(3) The enumeration of specific kinds of terms and conditions shall
not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it considers proper. The court may rescind or modify at any time of the terms and
conditions theretofore imposed by the court upon the probationer.
24. 327 So. 2d at 25.
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portion of the initial sentence for possible use in the future should the
terms of the probation be violated. 5 The Florida Supreme Court's rationale in Jones was evident in its response to the question certified to it
by the Third District Court of Appeal," when the court stated:
that a defendant placed on probation pursuant to Section
948.01(4), Florida Statutes (1973) who subsequently violates that

probation may be sentenced to imprisonment by the trial judge for
the same period of years as the court could have originally imposed
in accordance with Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1973), with-

out the necessity of establishing a term of sentence and withholding
7

a part of it at the initial sentencing proceedings.1

Incarceration as a Condition of Probation Is Not a Sentence
For The Purposes of Determining Eligibility for Parole
Despite the Florida Supreme Court's approval in Jones of incarceration as a condition of probation, the issue arises whether such con-

dition should be construed to be a sentence for determining a probationer's eligibility for parole consideration. Section 947.16(1) expressly

limits such eligibility to those persons incarcerated pursuant to a sentence. The Third District Court of Appeal, in McGowan v. State,2"
held that incarceration does not constitute a sentence, rather it is no

25. Id.
26. The question certified was:
Where one who could be sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period of years is sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail
... with direction that he be placed on probation upon completion of a
specified period .of such sentence with the remainder of the jail sentence
stayed and withheld . . ., upon revocation of the probation can the court
impose ... a new sentence in the state penitentiary for a period of years,
such as the court could have originally imposed . . ., or is the time to be
served, following revocation of probation which has been granted pursuant
to § 948.01(4), Fla. Stat., . . . limited to the unserved portion of the previously imposed jail sentence which was stayed and withheld upon placing
the defendant on probation?
id. at 20.
27. Id.
28. 362 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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more than a condition of probation. 9 Moreover, the Third District
Court of Appeal recognized the distinction between a sentence and an
order of probation. Probation is granted by the grace of the state in lieu
of a sentence with its primary purpose to be rehabilitation."0 Whereas,
a sentence is imposed "(a) to punish; (b) to deter similar criminal acts;
(c) to protect society; or, (d) to rehabilitate."3 1
The Third District Court of Appeal relies upon the express language of the Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.790(a). The rule
clearly states, "pronouncement and imposition of sentence of imprisonment shall not be made upon a defendant who is to be placed on probation regardless of whether such defendant has or has not been adjudicated guilty."3 2 By the language of the statute, the two concepts appear
to be mutually exclusive since one who is sentenced may not be on
probation.
Probation Conditions Requiring Excessive Terms of
Incarceration Are Determined to Diminish Rehabilitative
Function of Parole
Even though an order of probation is not a sentence, if an excessive prison term is imposed under the guise of probation, the order no
longer serves a rehabilitative function but tends to become punitive in
nature. 33 As this inconsistency became apparent, the districts began to
overturn the trial courts' imposition of probation which were conditioned on incarcerations of questionable length. 4
The Third District Court of Appeal considered the propriety of an
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Loeb v. State, 387 So. 2d 433, 436 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
Freeman v. State, 382 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.790(a).
Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla.

1980).
34. Cunningham v. State, 385 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (three
years confinement in the state penitentiary as a condition of ten years probation for
conviction of manslaughter); Freeman v. State, 382 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (five years imprisonment as a condition of ten years probation); Geter v. Wainwright, 380 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (ten years imprisonment as a
condition of fifteen years probation); Olcott v. State, 378 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (six years imprisonment as a condition of fifteen years probation).
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excessive term of incarceration imposed as a condition of probation in
Shead v. State.35 The court ruled that when the defendant received a
nine and one-half year term of incarceration as a condition of probation, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the split sentence
alternative. The court's reversal was justified by the trial court's statement that its ole purpose in imposing such a term "was to punish the
defendant by denying her any hope of parole." 6
The Second District Court of Appeal in Olcott v. State37 identified
the imposition of excessive terms of incarceration as conditions of probation as an attempt by the trial courts to evade what they considered
to be a liberal parole policy. 38 The defendant in Olcott pled guilty to
one count of attempted burglary, nine counts of burglary and four
counts of grand theft.39 The trial court ultimately imposed fifteen years
probation with the special condition that the defendant serve six years
in prison.40 In an amicus curiae brief submitted by the Florida Parole
and Probation Commission the court believed the Commission accurately stated the problem:
The true issue . . . is one regarding the fundamental nature and

relationship of and between probation and parole. The traditional
concepts of parole and probation are such that the two are separate, distinct, independent and unrelated conditions. Heretofore,
probation has always been accepted as something imposed in lieu
of incarceration, while parole has traditionally been accepted as a
measure which allows a prisoner to serve out the remainder of his
sentence outside incarceration.41
As noted by the Commission, parole and probation are sharply distinguishable. Parole has been defined as "the release of an offender
35. 367 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
36. Id. at 267 (emphasis added); see also Freeman, 382 So. 2d at 1308, where
the Third District Court of Appeal ruled that five years imprisonment to be served in
the state penitentiary imposed under the guise of a special condition of ten years probation was not permissible.
37. 378 So. 2d 303.
38. Id. at 305.
39. Id. at 303.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 304.
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from a penal or correctional institution after he has served a portion of
his sentence, under the custody of the state and under conditions that
permit his reincarceration in the event of misbehavior." 42 Whereas probation is "a disposition that allows the convicted offender to remain
free in the community while supervised by a person who helps him lead
a law-abiding life."' 3
The court in Olcott suggested a possible solution would be to
"read Section 947.16 broadly enough to encompass a term of confinement of twelve months or more imposed as a condition of probation.
But this would contemplate the possibility that a person could be on
parole and probation at the same time." 44 Furthermore, there exists the
possible anomaly that a probationer serving a lengthy term in prison as
a condition of probation may consider it advantageous to violate the
terms of his probation to provoke the imposition of a sentence under
which he would eventually become eligible for parole consideration."5
The court in Olcott recognized the authority of Jones, to "place
the defendant on probation and include, as a condition, incarceration
for a specific period of time within the maximum sentence allowed.""
The Second District Court of Appeal stated, however, it did not believe
Jones addressed the issue presented in Olcott because it failed to "consider the impact on the parole process of a jail term as a condition of
probation.'4 7 Moreover, the Third District Court of Appeal, in Shead
v. State,"8 expressed doubt that a trial court, by imposing an excessive
prison term as a condition of probation, can usurp the exclusive authority of the Parole Board to grant or deny parole to a person serving
time.' 9 Upon this logic, the court in Olcott noted, "[t]here is much to
be said for a maximum limitation of one year for incarceration as a
condition of probation because it would avoid any conflict with Section
H.

WEIHOFEN,

CRIMINAL CORRECTION

546 (1963).

42. S.

RUBIN,

G.

43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 176.
378 So. 2d at 304 n.1.
Id. at 304-05.
Id. at 303 (emphasis added).

47.

Id.

48.

367 So. 2d 264.

EDWARDS

& S.

ROSENZWEIG, THE LAW OF

49. Id. at 268.
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947.16. "50

Florida Supreme Court Sets Maximum Incarceration Allowable
as Condition of Probation in Villery
The validity of incarceration imposed as a condition of probation
was again examined by the Florida Supreme Court in Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission. Lula M. Villery previously
pleaded guilty to five counts of knowingly issuing worthless checks in
excess of fifty dollars.5 1 The trial court withheld adjudication of her
guilt and placed her on probation, not to exceed two and one-half
years. 2 Ms. Villery subsequently violated the terms of her probation
and, upon rehearing, the trial court adjudicated her guilty of the original charges. 53 Pursuant to her violation of probation, the trial court
extended her probation to five years and imposed, as a special condition, concurrent county jail terms of two and one-half years for each of
the charges.54 Ms. Villery was given two days credit toward the jail
term for time she had already spent in the Dade County jail. 5
The Florida Parole and Probation Commission took the position
that Ms. Villery was not incarcerated pursuant to a sentence, but
rather as a special condition of probation. 58 Relying on the rule that
"[e]very person. . . whose sentence. . . or cumulative sentences total
12 months or more. . . shall . . . be eligible for consideration for pa-

role", 57 the Commission informed Ms. Villery that she did not qualify
for parole review because she was not incarcerated pursuant to a sentence.58 Ms. Villery asserted that incarceration imposed as a condition
of probation should be considered a "sentence" for purposes of parole
consideration eligibility. 59 Thus, Ms. Villery petitioned the Florida Su50.
51.
52.

378 So. 2d at 305 n.4.
396 So. 2d at 1108.
Id.

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56.

Id.

57.

FLA. STAT.

58.

396 So. 2d at 1108.

§ 947.16(1) (1981) (emphasis added).

59. Id. at 1109.
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preme Court to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the Florida Parole
and Probation Commission to review her eligibility for parole60 pursuant to Florida Statutes section 947.16(1) (1979).61
The Florida Supreme Court expressly ruled in Villery "that incarceration, pursuant to the split sentence alternatives found in sections
948.01(4) and 948.03(2), which equals or exceeds one year is invalid.
This applies to incarceration as a condition of probation as well as to
incarceration followed by a specific period of probation. 62 The court
recognized that a person must be sentenced to at least one year to be

eligible for parole under section 947.16(1). It construed this language
to indicate a legislative intent "to limit the period of incarceration
which may be imposed as a condition of probation under section
948.01(4) to a period of less than one year. If a longer period of incarceration could be imposed as a probation condition the trial judge
'63
could, in effect, negate the parole policy of this state.
The court went further to rule that Villery would apply retroactively and that a person who is serving a term in prison, under the split
sentence alternative, which is not in accord with this decision may have
60. Id. at 1108.
61. FLA. STAT. § 947.16(1) (1981) (which is identical to the 1979 version)
provides:
(1) Every person who has been, or who may hereafter be, convicted of a
felony or who has been convicted of one or more misdemeanors and whose
sentence or cumulative sentences total 12 months or more, who is confined
in execution of the judgment of the court, and whose record during confinement is good, shall, unless otherwise provided by law, be eligible for
consideration for parole. An inmate who has been sentenced for an indeterminate term or a term of 5 years or less shall have an initial interview
conducted by a hearing examiner within 6 months after the initial date of
confinement in execution of the judgment. An inmate who has been sentenced for a minimum term in excess of 5 years shall have an initial interview conducted by a hearing examiner within 1 year after the initial date
of confinement in execution of the judgment. An inmate convicted of a
capital crime shall be interviewed at the discretion of the commission. As
used in this section, the term "confined" shall be deemed to include presence in any appropriate treatment facility, public or private, by virtue of
transfer from the Department of Corrections under any applicable law.
62. 396 So. 2d at 1111.
63. Id.
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the illegal sentence corrected. 4 The following guidelines were established for the correction of nonconforming decisions:
In correcting the order, the trial court has the option either of modifying the order to make it legal or of withdrawing it and imposing
a sentence of imprisonment. However, unless a condition of probation is determined to have been violated, the court may not extend
the term of probation either with or without incarceration, nor may
the court impose a sentence of imprisonment for a period of time in
excess of the original total term of probation. If a condition of probation is found to have been violated, the court may modify or continue the probation or may revoke the probation and impose any
sentence which it might originally have imposed before placing the
defendant on probation. . . . In modifying probation or in revoking
probation and sentencing the probationer, credit must be given for
time spent incarcerated pursuant to a split sentence probation order. Thus in modifying a probation order, no additional period of
incarceration may be imposed on a probationer who has already
served one year or more of incarceration. And in pronouncing a
sentence of imprisonment on a probationer whose probation has
been withdrawn because of a illegal probation order, the time spent
incarcerated pursuant to the probation order will be deemed to
have been time spent in prison under a sentence.6 5

Subsequent Applications of Villery
Since the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Villery, the Florida
District Courts of Appeal have affirmed numerous pre-Villery convictions, but remanded the cases to the trial courts for resentencing in
accordance with the direction of Villery.6 6 Subsequent trial court rul64. Id. "[A]n error in sentencing that causes a defendant to be incarcerated or
restrained for a greater length of time than the law permits is fundamental. Such an
error can be corrected on appeal or by a trial court in collateral attack proceedings."
Gonzalez v. State, 392 So. 2d 334, 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see also FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.850 which allows a defendant, who has been incarcerated for a greater time
than the law permits because of a sentencing error, to have the error corrected on
appeal or by collateral attack in the trial court on the grounds that such error is
fundamental.
65. 396 So. 2d at 1112.
66. See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 402 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Good-
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ings imposing the split sentence alternative, or incarceration as a condition of probation, have been carefully framed within the parameters of
Villery.
Several issues have arisen, which involve the split sentence alternative, but are distinguishable from Villery. The first materialized in
Peak v. State67 where the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to one
count of attempted murder and two counts of burglary, for which the
court imposed a split sentence of five years imprisonment (with a
mandatory sentence of three years for use of a firearm) followed by ten
years probation. 68 The defendant cited to Villery as the authority for
his claim that the order of the trial court was improper.6 9
Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal ruled that the defendant's
sentence was the result of a negotiated plea, and it did not follow a
trial and conviction, therefore they could not "give the [defendant] re'70
lief from his bargain without also offering the State the same relief.
The appeal was accordingly dismissed without prejudice. The defendant's right to seek relief, if any, had to come from the trial court
where he and the State would be at equal advantage. 1
The second instance in which a split sentence was imposed, but not
controlled by Villery, occurred where the sentencing was pursuant to a
conviction for multiple offenses. Florida's First District Court of Appeal recognized that the 364 day maximum for incarceration, imposed
as a condition of probation, applies only where incarceration and probation are imposed for the same offense. Such limitation does not apply, however, to a period of incarceration for a year or more followed
by probation where the incarceration and probation are imposed for
separate offenses. 2
Moreover, in a recent decision, Florida's Second District Court of
Appeal authorized an innovative combination of split sentences in reman v. State, 399 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Walker v. State, 399 So.
2d 63 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Webb v. State, 392 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1980).
67. 399 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1044.
72. Tobin v. State, 401 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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viewing the sentence of a defendant convicted of two crimes.73 The
court permitted a hybrid of the split sentence alternative which effectively allowed a period of incarceration which exceeded one year to
precede a period of probation. The sentence imposed was comprised of
two five year terms of probation for each offense, to run concurrently,
with two terms of incarceration as a condition of that probation of 364
days each, to run consecutively.74 The effect was to confine the defendant for two years (less two days) and to subsequently place him on
probation for the remaining three years.
Conclusion
The Florida Supreme Court in Villery expressly limited the period
for which a defendant, convicted of a single offense, may be incarcerated as a condition of probation or pursuant to a split sentence order to
less than one year. It has since been decided that the mandate of Villery does not generally apply to convictions for multiple offenses or to
convictions through negotiated pleas.75 Nevertheless, the court, in Viilery, has substantially clarified the application of section 948.01(4) of
the Florida Statutes.
James E. Morgan, III

73. Ellis v. State, 406 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
74. Id.
75. Peak v. State, 399 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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